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Breaking the Logjam: Proposals for Moving Beyond the Equals Approach
Abstract
Over the last decade, the structure and performance of Canadian financial institutions has undergone a
profound transformation. Propelled by both regulatory changes and market innovations, Canadian financial
institutions have found their historically protected markets opened to intense competition from a variety of
different sources. The most significant regulatory change has been the piecemeal dismantling of the pillars that
have traditionally separated the core activities of banks, insurance companies, loan and trust companies, and
securities dealers from encroachment by one another. With lower entry barriers, institutions have scrambled
to penetrate each other's markets. This entry has spurred a narrowing of differences in the structure and
conduct of Canadian financial institutions.
Another regulatory change that has spurred increased competition is the reduction, (or, in the case of
American owned Schedule II banks, outright elimination) of the constraints that have traditionally limited the
operations of foreign financial institutions in Canada. Not surprisingly, the reduction of these restrictions has
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BREAKING THE LOGJAM: PROPOSALS FOR MOVING
BEYOND THE EQUALS APPROACH
RonaldJ. Danielsi'
Over the last decade, the structure and performance of
Canadian financial institutions has undergone a profound trans-
formation. Propelled by both regulatory changes and market
innovations, Canadian financial institutions have found their
historically protected markets opened to intense competition from
a variety of different sources.! The most significant regulatory
change has been the piecemeal dismantling of the pillars that have
traditionally separated the core activities of banks, insurance
companies, loan and trust companies, and securities dealers from
encroachment by one another. With lower entry barriers, institu-
tions have scrambled to penetrate each other's markets. This entry
has spurred a narrowing of differences in the structure and
conduct of Canadian financial institutions.
Another regulatory change that has spurred increased compe-
tition is the reduction, (or, in the case of American owned
Schedule II banks, outright elimination) of the constraints that
have traditionally limited the operations of foreign financial insti-
tutions in Canada. Not surprisingly, the reduction of these restric-
tions has spawned the growth of a highly dynamic foreign financial
industry in Canada.2
• Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University ofToronto. I would like to thank Michael
Andrews, Ray Labrosse and George Triantis for comments on an earlier draft of this
article. A special note of gratitude is due to my colleagues, Robert Howse and Jacob
Ziegel. This article has been substantially enriched by the ongoing dialogue we have had
over the last several years respecting both the possibilities and limits of competitive feder-
alism in Canada. Ofcourse, the usual disclaimer applies.
1 Many of these trends are discussed in: Economic Council of Canada, Globalization and
Canada's Financial Markets (Ottawa, Ministry of Supply and Services, 1990). See also:
Harvey Lazar, Andree Mayrand and Keith Patterson, "Global Competition and
Canadian Federalism: The Financial Sector" (1991), 20 C.B.L.J. 1. Of course, many of
the same trends affecting Canadian financial institutions have also been observed in the
United States. A useful overview is provided by Robert Utan, The Revolution in U.S.
Finance (Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution, 1991).
2 Under the Bank Act, the entry of foreign banking institutions is subject to a variety of
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But competition has not derived solely from regulatory
changes. Market innovations - particularly those offered by
market intermediaries - have generated new products that have
made dramatic inroads into the traditional preserve of financial
institutions. This competition has been felt on both the asset
(investment) and liability (borrowing) side. On the liability side,
pension funds and mutual funds now vie with traditional financial
institutions to attract scarce investment dollars. By offering
investors a greater diversity of investment products (as measured
by their risk and return characteristics), market intermediaries
have been able to lure investment dollars away from traditional
financial institutions to a broad range of new investment funds. On
the asset side, the creation of liquid markets for, among other
things, insured residential mortgages, automobile leases, and the
commercial paper of triple A credits has lowered the adminis-
trative costs of credit, which has, in tum, increased the attrac-
tiveness of these products to both retail and commercial
borrowers.
There is little doubt that increased competition has conferred
very tangible benefits on Canadian investors, borrowers and
consumers in the form of an expanded range of price competitive
products and services. It is equally clear, however, that this
competition has inflicted a price on established financial institu-
tions in the form of reduced profit margins on many of their tradi-
tionallending activities. Financial institutions have responded in
several ways, both positive and negative, to a tightening of
income: by increasing the riskiness of their investment portfolio so
as to increase expected returns, by entering into new lines of
business (e.g., foreign currency and interest rate risk
management), and by aggressively cutting production costs.3
In pursuing the last of these aforementioned goals - cost
reduction - it is not at all surprising that Canadian financial insti-
tutions, as one of the most highly regulated industries in the
country, have placed the system of solvency and supervisory
regulation that governs their activities under exacting scrutiny.
different restrictions, including aggregate size constraints and net benefit tests. However,
under chapter 17 of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, American institutions are
entitled to the spirit of national treatment, which prohibits differential treatment of
American and Canadian institutions.
3 While the last two changes are desirable from a public policy perspective, increased risk-
taking is much less so.
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Nowhere is concern with regulation more palpable than in the case
of the loan and trust industry. Industry attention to regulatory
structure derives from the fact that both the federal and provincial
governments have asserted jurisdiction over their conduct,
subjecting industry members to two or more wholly independent
regulatory regimes aimed at the same basic set of regulatory
goals.4 This situation stands in stark contrast to other areas of
shared financial federal-provincial jurisdiction, say transportation
or product labelling, where different levels of government purport
at least to regulate different aspects of the same activity.
Obviously, with multiple sets of regulation, the cost of
providing financial services for loan and trusts is raised in
comparison to other competitors providing similar services and
products, which are subject either to one coherent set of safety
and soundness regulations (e.g., banks) or to no regulation at all
(e.g. , commercial firms like GMAC). In some cases, the costs of
compliance with multiple regulation are quite low and are distin-
guished mainly for their annoyance value.s In other cases,
however, compliance with multiple regulatory schemes may be
extremely expensive or, even more distressing, virtually impos-
sible. This can occur when the regulations of one jurisdiction
expressly contradict the regulations of another.
. In view of the non-trivial costs inflicted by existing federal
arrangements in loan and trust regulation, the industry's plea for
ambitious constitutional reordering is predictable. 6 Yet,
4 Both the federal and provincial governments claim jurisdiction under the Constitution
Act, 1867 (U.K.), to charter loan and trust corporations. Federal jurisdiction emanates
from the federal incorporation power, while provincial jurisdiction derives from authority
over property and civil rights in the province (s. 92(13» and over the incorporation of
companies with provincial objectives (s. 92(11».
The impact of federalism on the regulation of financial institutions has been discussed in
a number of different articles. See, for instance: W. Moull, E. Waitzer and J. Ziegel,
"The Changing Regulatory Environment for Canadian Financial Institutions: Constitu-
tional Aspects and Federal-Provincial Relations" in J. Ziegel, L. Waverman, and D.W.
Conklin, Canadian Financial Institutions: Changing the Regulatory Environment
(Toronto, Ontario Economic Council, 1985). See also: P. McDonald, "The B.N.A. Act
and the Near Banks: A Case Study in Federalism" (1972), lOAlta. L.R. 155; andJ. Chant
and J. Dean, "An Approach to the Regulation of Banking Institutions in a Federal State"
(1982),20 Osgoode Hall L.J. 721.
5 This is so for duplicative regulations that stipulate the separate filing of essentially similar
information with each jurisdiction.
6 Industry criticism of the current regulatory regime is reported by A. Michael Andrews,
Remarks, The Trust Companies Association of Canada Annual Conference, April 30,
1992.
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irrespective of whether the proposed reordering is ambitious
(wholesale transfer of jurisdiction of the regulation of loan and
trusts to the federal government) or more modest in nature
(conclusion of an intergovernmental accord that binds the
provinces to a uniform pattern of regulation), industry officials
tend to overlook some of the core benefits to be realized from a
decentralized scheme of regulation. The dysfunctional nature of
the present decentralized regime makes industry hostility to
decentralization understandable, though lamentable. As I have
argued elsewhere, properly devised decentralized federal arrange-
ments have the capacity to produce responsive and innovative
regulatory products.?
In the loan and trust setting, it is my belief that a relatively
modest set of refinements to the existing regime would greatly
increase the likelihood of superior legislation being produced.8
The challenge for federal and provincial politicians is to effect
changes to the current regime that remedy its most perverse
features, but without abandoning a core role for lower level
governments. One sensible proposal in this direction would be the
adoption of a European-style mutual recognition regime.
However, for a variety of reasons to be discussed below, agree-
ments among sovereign governments that facilitate and, indeed,
foster direct competition among their bureaucratic elites are
enormously difficult to conclude. This is a point which has been
generally overlooked in the literature on competitive federalism.9
7 R. Daniels, "Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law
Market" (1991), 36 McGill L.J. 130.
B The value of the competitive federalism model in the financial institutions context has
been recognized by a number of different commentators. See, for instance: T.
Courchene, Economic Management and the Division ofPowers, vol. 67 of the background
papers for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects
for Canada (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985), at p. 198 (endorsing the value
of decentralized competition in the securities area); Canada, Standing Senate Committee
on Banking, Trade and Commerce: Toward a More Competitive Financial Environment
(Ottawa, Senate of Canada, 1986): "multiple jurisdictions may be conducive to greater
experimentation and innovation. The costs of an inappropriate expansion of powers may
still be serious, but these costs would be localized and thus minimized in comparison to a
situation where such an experiment were conducted nation wide" (at p. 63); and Law and
Economics Workshop Series, Regulation of Financial Institutions: Some Notes on
Regulatory Competition, Working Paper No. WS 1989-90-(5), by N. Roy (Toronto,
Faculty of Law, 1990) (decentralized competition led by Quebec responsible for moderni-
zation of financial institution regulation).
9 For a recent theoretical review of the competitive federalism literature, see: D. Kenyon
and J. Kincaid, eds., Competition Among States and Local Governments (Washington,
D.C., Urban Institute Press, 1991).
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In light of the relatively bleak prospects for multilateral
government negotiations to conclude arrangements facilitative of
intergovernmental competition, I argue for an enhanced, though
well-demarcated, role for federal government unilateralism in
creating the framework for effective and durable decentralized
arrangements.
TOWARD AN OPTIMAL REGULATORY REGIME FOR LOAN AND
TRUSTS
In thinking about which set of distribution of power arrange-
ments are most congenial to creation of an efficient regulatory
regime for loan and trust companies, it is important to stress that
there are both costs and benefits to every set of distribution of
power arrangements and, as a consequence, the choice of any
regulatory structure will, inevitably, invite balancing among
competing goals. Usually the balancing exercise is guided by a rule
of net benefit - policy-makers should opt for the distribution of
power arrangements which produces the greatest benefits to
society relative to the attendant social costs.
The following functional criteria are frequently invoked by
federalism scholars as a way of organizing cost-benefit analysis of
both decentralized and centralized schemes of regulation: 10
(i) economies of scale: does decentralized jurisdiction over the policy area
impede the realization of economies of scale in the production of regulation?
In the context of financial institutions regulation, does the fact that
regulatory supervision is vested in two federal agencies (OSF! and CDIe)
and numerous provincial agencies (e.g., Ontario Ministry of Financial Insti-
tutions) create duplicative administrative costs? How significant would the
administrative cost savings be if the entire system of solvency and super-
visory regulation were to be consolidated into one central agency?
(ii) externalities: does decentralized provision of regulation impose costs on
citizens located in other provinces which are not taken into account by
provincial regulators? Concern over external impacts is a central justifi-
cation for the Equals Approach adopted by Ontario [to be discussed in depth
below]. That is, without stringent enforcement of its own distinctive
regulatory regime, Ontario has argued that it is concerned about the possible
10 For a discussion of the various methodologies available to evaluate federal structures, see
R. Simeon, "Criteria for Choice in Federal Systems" (1982-1983),18 Queens L.J. 131;
G. Stevenson, "The Division of Powers" in R. Simeon, Division of Powers and Public
Policy, vol. 61 of Research Studies for the Royal Commission on the Economic Union
and Development Prospects for Canada (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985), at
p.71.
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abuses that its depositors could suffer from the actions of extra-provincially
incorporated institutions.
(iii) transaction costs: does decentralized provision of regulation create
excessive transaction costs that reduce the operational efficiency of
Canadian capital markets? This goes back to the concerns raised by the
industry with multijurisdictional compliance costs that were identified
earlier.
(iv) innovation: does decentralized provision of regulation enhance the
degree of successful innovation and experimentation undertaken by
regulators in a given policy area? In the financial institutions realm, the lead
role played by Ontario in the modernization of its loan and trust legislation
- Bill 116 - served as a catalyst which inspired other Canadian jurisdic-
tions, including the federal government, to overhaul their own legislation.
The same is true of many of the securities industry reforms introduced by
Quebec (e.g., allowing higher foreign ownership of market intermediaries).
By allowing single jurisdictions to legislate without having to secure the
consent of other jurisdictions, the likelihood of legislative experimentation
is increased. Further, such experimentation reduces the costs of widespread
legislative mistake. If the innovation is a success, then citizens in other juris-
dictions will pressure their own governments into adopting the successful
reform.lll) On the other hand, if the innovation proves defective, non-inno-
vating jurisdictions can simply refrain from adopting the legislation, thereby
protecting their citizens from the costs of mistaken policy.
(v) responsiveness and accountability: does decentralized provision of
regulation produce financial regulation that is responsive and accountable to
citizen preferences? To the extent that citizen preferences for financial
regulation vary within the country, do these preferences coalesce within
provincial boundaries? Relatedly, are there gaping holes in the system of
regulation owing to various constitutional constraints. For instance, is the
structure and stability of the existing system of financial regulation hobbled
by the inability of provincial regulators to supervise effectively upstream
holding companies? Is the system of regulation so confusing that institutions
and depositors are incapable of knowing with certainty which regulator is
responsible for which particular regulatory initiative?
(vi) dynamic adjustment costs: provisionally assuming that there is a case for
shifting jurisdiction from the provincial to the federal level of government,
how serious are the adjustment costs occasioned by constitutional
reordering?
THE EVALUATIVE CRITERIA AS APPLIED TO THE CURRENT LOAN
AND TRUST REGIME
In applying these criteria to the case of loan and trust
11 This emulation effect explains the diffusion ofsocialized health insurance schemes across
Canada.
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regulation, it is clear that the current system is plagued by serious,
debilitating defects. Quite simply, it is a system which mixes the
worst characteristics of both decentralized and centralized
arrangements, with few of the benefits of either. In large part,
dysfunctional federalism is attributable to the jurisdictional
overlap and duplication created by Ontario's adoption of the
Equals Approach in 1987.12 Stripped to its barest essentials, the
Equals Approach stipulates that before any extra-provincially
chartered institution (including those that are federally chartered)
is given permission to operate within Ontario, it must agree to
abide by a wide range of corporate governance and investment
limits that are prescribed in Ontario's loan and trust legislation. 13
The antecedent for the Equals Approach was the notorious
Greymac affair, in which several Ontario trust companies failed
after a series of high profile self-dealing transactions. 14 The
12 See Louise Pelly, Harmonization: A Federal Perspective, prepared speech at the Institute
for International Research Conference on the New Financial Services Regulation,
February 25, 1992, at p. 3: "While the trust and loan companies may be the main victims
of the lack of uniformity, the principal perpetrator of the injustice is the Loan and Trust
Corporations Act (1987) of Ontario". See also J. Chertkow, Worst Among Equals: An
Analysis ofOntario's Equals Approach, Canadian Institute speech (1989); Jacob Ziegel,
The Regulatory Evolution: Is there Light at the End of the Tunnel, prepared remarks for
Insight Conference on Financial Services Reform, April 7-8,1992; and Senate Banking
Committee, Canada 1992: Toward a National Market in Financial Services, Eighth
Report of the Standing Committee on Banking, Trade, and Commerce, May 1990.
13 Under Bill 116 (The Loan and Trust Corporations Act, S.O. 1987, c. 33, now R.S.O.
1990, c. L.25), before undertaking activity as a loan and trust corporation within
Ontario, an extra-provincially chartered institution must first become registered with the
Superintendent of the Loan and Trust Branch of the Ministry of Financial Institutions (s.
213). Section 39(1) ofthe Act requires that the extra-provincially chartered institution be
able to show that it can comply with certain enumerated provisions of the Act. These
sections pertain, inter alia, to share alienability, board composition and fitness of
directors, role of outside directors, and directors' duties and liabilities. To the extent that
these provisions contradict comparable provisions in the jurisdiction of incorporation,
the Superintendent is able to waive application of the Ontario provisions providing that
"depositors will be adequately protected" (s. 39(4». In addition, however, a range of
provisions within the statute apply to extra-provincially chartered institutions because of
their application to all regulated (both provincial and extra-provincially chartered) insti-
tutions. These provisions relate to information provision and record keeping, conflict of
interest transactions, business and investment powers, permissible corporate structures,
and various statutory remedies for wrongdoing. Any gaps in this comprehensive
regulatory structure are filled by requiring extra-provincially chartered institutions to
provide the Superintendent, as a precondition of registration, with a "voluntary" under-
taking that the institution will "adhere ... to the terms, conditions and restrictions, if
any, imposed on its registration" (s. 32(1».
14 See discussion in B. Cass, remarks for Institute for International Research Conference,
Complying with the New Financial Services Regulations, Identifying Emerging Market
Opportunities, February 25, 1992 at p. 20.
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Greymac affair exposed in quite arresting terms the frailties of the
existing scheme of regulation. Quite simply, antiquated legislation
then in force in Ontario and elsewhere proved to be no match for
the contrivances and ingenuity of unscrupulous industry partici-
pants. Into this breach stepped the Ontario government, first with
the Dupre Report, and second with Bill 116 - an extensive
overhaul and modernization of the province's loan and trust legis-
lation. Recognizing that the adoption of Bill 116 would make
Ontario the most stringent loan and trust regime in the country,
the province used the Equals Approach as a way of tempering the
incentive of Ontario institutions to reincorporate in more lenient
jurisdictions. IS
Why has the Equals Approach been so reviled? First, by
insisting that extra-provincially incorporated institutions submit to
Ontario's jurisdiction, the legislation undermines the vision of
equal legitimacy and competence that lies at the very core of the
federal idea.
Second, by requiring compliance with its own regime, as well as
the regime of the chartering jurisdiction, the Equals Approach
generates excessive transaction costs. As mentioned above, these
costs can be quite significant particularly when the chartering and
host jurisdiction's specify rules that directly contradict one
another, requiring the institution to expend time and resources
reconciling the two.
A third problem with the Equals Approach is its impact on
depositors and institutions chartered outside Ontario. Unless an
institution is willing to suffer the expense of segregating its activ-
ities into two separate institutions - one that would be governed
by the Equals Approach and be confined in its operation to
Ontario, and the second which would operate outside Ontario
and, therefore, fall outside the ambit of the Equals Approach-
an extra-provincially chartered institution will be forced to adhere
to Ontario-based standards in many of its core activities, even
when those activities are conducted exclusively in provinces other
than Ontario. This is particularly so in respect of Bill 116's
corporate governance provisions. The fact that non-Ontario
15 In this vein, Cass, ibid., at p. 20, states that: "As Ontario modernized its legislation", the
previous similarity of the Ontario statute to legislation throughout Canada ceased to
exist. To ensure equal protection for depositors and a relatively similar competitive
environment among industry participants in the Province of Ontario, all corporations
operating in Ontario were required to adhere to Ontario's standard."
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residents (both depositors and shareholders of extra-provincially
incorporated companies) are governed by Ontario legislation
poses vexing problems for democratic theories of legislative
accountability.
Fourth, by formalizing control over extra-provincial institu-
tions, the Equals Approach obscures regulatory accountability.
With multiple regulators supervising industry behaviour, inevi-
table conflicts in independent schemes of regulation are resolved
through ad hoc intergovernmental adjustments. Significantly,
policy adjustment through intergovernmental negotiation is an
exercise that is characterized by scant public consultation and
debate, thereby lending further force to the accountability
concerns raised earlier. 16 Moreover, with regulation dependent
upon the whim and discretion of regulators, industry officials face
considerable difficulty in knowing which rules apply to which
transaction and to what extent. This uncertainty, of course,
increases the cost of transactional activity.
Fifth, because the Equals Approach can be used to trump the
regulatory initiatives of another jurisdiction, the most important
benefits of decentralized distribution of power arrangements -
namely, experimentation and innovation - are thwarted. Under
the Equals Approach, any regulatory initiative taken by a
province other than Ontario, no matter how dynamic and forward
looking, can be squelched if it is deemed to conflict with the provi-
sions of Bill 116. By stifling innovations even before they are tried,
the Equals Approach denies citizens in both the chartering juris-
diction and elsewhere the opportunity to obtain welfare gains
from improvements in regulatory performance.
Finally, by selectively sterilizing certain aspects of extra-pro-
vinciallegislation, the Equals Approach may generate incoherent
and unprincipled systems of regulation. Many of these concerns
were raised in a recent speech by Louise Pelly. 17 Pelly identifies a
number of sections contained in the federal government's new
loan and trust legislation, Bill C_4,17a which, barring a waiver of
16 Donald Smiley was, of course, one of the earliest commentators to point out the
democratic process values compromised by executive federalism. See, for instance, D.
Smiley, "An Outsider's Observations of Federal-Provincial Relations Among
Consenting Adults" in R. Simeon, ed., Confrontation and Collaboration: Intergovern-
mental Relations in Canada Today (Toronto, Institute of Public Administration of
Canada, 1979), at p. 105.
17 Pelly, supra, footnote 12.
17a S.C. 1991, c. 45, in force June 1, 1992.
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compliance with Ontario legislation by the Ontario government,
will be sterilized by the Equals Approach. One of the greatest
ironies of the Equals Approach is that the initiative, which was at
least in part a reaction to a lack of federal leadership, is subverting
federal government leadership now that it has decided to act.
RESTORING THE BALANCE: IS THERE ANY CURRENT
JUSTIFICATION FOR MAINTENANCE OF THE EQUALS
APPROACH?
As previously discussed, the strongest and most frequently
invoked rationale in favour of the Equals Approach was the fear
of competitive reincorporation. Absent mandatory licensing,
irresponsible (or, even worse , opportunistic) chartering jurisdic-
tions could create a regulatory regime that permitted shareholders
of loan and trusts to engage in excessive risk-taking. Because of
their high levels of financial leverage, shareholders of financial
institutions will be naturally inclined to increase the riskiness of
the firm's assets, hence the creditors' debt, in order to raise the
returns they receive as residual claimants.l8 Although excessive
risk-taking by shareholders in commercial companies is controlled
by interest rate pricing and myriad contractual restrictions, these
techniques are far less effective in the financial institution context
and, as a consequence, government regulation is required.
Why can't the creditors (depositors) of financial institutions
create optimal contracts without the assistance of the state? The
traditional rationale for regulation of financial institutions is based
on the inability of small-stakes creditors (i.e., depositors) to
negotiate and enforce optimal restrictions on shareholder
risk-taking.l9 However, while possessing some force, the small-
18 The divergence of interest between shareholders and creditors in responding to certain
types of transactions is formally known as the agency costs of debt. For a basic intro-
duction to agency theory see: Barnea, Haugen and Senbet, Agency Problems and
Financial Contracting (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1985), chapters 3
and 4; or Klein and Coffee, Business Organizations and Finance: Legal and Economic
Principles, 4th ed. (Westbury, N.Y., Foundation Press, 1990), chapter 4.
19 These problems can be illustrated by simple example. If it is assumed that a financial
institution has 1,000 depositors who each deposit $100 in the institution (for a total
investment of$1oo,OOO) and, further, that $1,000 spent on negotiation and enforcement-
related activities will prevent shareholders from squandering $10,000 of depositors'
funds, then it is obvious that the funds should be expended on enforcement. Depositors
as a group are made better off by $9,000 and, therefore, each depositor should be willing
to contribute $10. However, what is rational for a group acting as a whole often becomes
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stakes story is not a complete rationale for regulation. While
small-stakes investors may not be capable of negotiating tailored
debt contracts with the institution, they (or at least marginal
depositors) can insist that the corporation increase the rate of
return on debt to the point where this return is commensurate with
the risks actually assumed. And, if this price is too expensive, then
the institution will commit to a conservative course of action,
which will lower its costs of debt. 20 As well, private sector bonding
agencies may assist passive depositors by certifying insitutions for
soundness - again without governmental support. 21
In light of defects in the depositor apathy rationale for financial
institution regulation, other rationales for regulation are impli-
cated. Some draw on government paternalism - the belief that
depositors should be prevented from making excessively risky
investments. 22 Other rationales draw on the fungible nature of
financial assets, and the opportunities they present for undetected
insider opportunism.23 Yet still others view the principal rationale
for regulation of financial institutions to be based on the perverse
effects of government commitments to certain types of distor-
tionary regulation and the need for some type of corrective or
compensatory regulation. 24
irrational from the perspective of each member of the group. Because each member will
realize that the $10 she contributes will benefit other depositors as much as herself, she
will be loath to part with the funds, and will instead rely ("free ride") on the contribu-
tions made by other investors. Nevertheless, the same rationale that makes one depositor
apathetic applies with equal force to other depositors, and, as a consequence, the
investment that made so much sense to the group will not be made.
20 This analysis is developed in depth in C. Smith and J. Warner, "On Financial
Contracting: An Analysis ofBond Covenants" (1979), 7 J. Financial Econ. 117.
21 This is not a far-fetched claim. Recently in Canada a private monitoring agency, Trac
Industries, has played an important role in evaluating the soundness of the Canadian
insurance industry. The company was instrumental in alerting the Canadian public of
problems in institutional performance well in advance of any indications of problems
from regulating governments.
22 See discussion in R. Clark, "The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries" (1976), 86 Yale
L.J.1.
23 See, Clark, ibid.
24 These policies are flat rate based deposit insurance and full compensation for all depos-
itors (including uninsured depositors) upon the failure of an institution. Although these
policies are aimed at promoting stability, they inexorably lead to less vigilant depositor
monitoring which, in tum, increases the scope for shareholder risk-taking. To temper the
effect of these policies, government must implement corrective legislation, which
ratchets up the aggregate level of financial regulation. The leading and most vociferous
exponent of this view is E. Kane. See, for instance, E. Kane, "Competitive Financial
Regulation: An International Perspective" in R. Portes and A. Swoboda, eds., Threats
To International Financial Stability (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987),
chapter 4.
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Evaluation of the Equals Approach requires attention to all
these rationales. If the central purpose of regulation is to temper
incentives for irresponsible (perhaps even fraudulent) conduct by
the insiders (shareholders and managers) of financial institutions,
then the obvious question is why won't chartering governments be
equal to this task? Why, for instance, can Ontario not assume that
the federal government and the remaining provinces are just as
committed to sound regulation as it is? To understand Ontario's
fear over this issue it is important to acknowledge that those
features of the current financial institutional regulatory regime
(flat rate based deposit insurance, perverse bank closure policies)
which dull incentives for responsible behaviour by institutional
insiders will have the same effect on chartering governments.
Because the full costs (both political and financial) of the failure of
an institution are borne principally by the federal government as
deposit insurer, chartering provincial governments will expend
less effort supervising institutional behaviour than if they were
saddled with all of these costs.
Indeed, one could go further, by arguing that under a regime of
externalized responsibility chartering governments will deliber-
ately create incentives for indigenous institutions to skew their
investment portfolio in a direction that vindicates parochial
provincial industrial policy objectives. To induce shareholders of
indigenous institutions to undertake this investment, the
chartering government will, either explicitly through portfolio
rules or implicitly through their supervisory activities, hold out the
carrot of increased risk-taking.25 In return, for instance, for
investing in local real estate or commercial enterprises at levels
that would not be observed in a world of vigilant depositor
monitoring, shareholders are permitted to increase the risk of
their portfolio, but without having to pay additional compensation
to depositors.
Nevertheless, if concern over competitive deregulation was
legitimate in 1987, the fact that several jurisdictions have since
revised their loan and trust legislation in the direction of the
standards promulgated in Bill 116 undermines the continued
relevance of this rationale. By stimulating the development of
25 These themes are developed at length in R. Daniels, "Form Over Substance: Bad Policy
As a Recipe for Bad Federalism in the Regulation of Canadian Financial Institutions" ,
forthcoming, Osgoode Hall L.J.
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modern and responsible systems of regulation, the tonic of the
Equals Approach has done the trick, and it is now safe for the
initiative to be rescinded. The appropriateness of doing so is
further underscored by the tremendous concentration of
chartering activity of loan and trusts under federal legislation.
Data (from 1989) show that there were 56 trust companies
chartered with the federal government, and that the total insured
deposits of these companies (a crude proxy for asset size)
amounted to 85% of total insured industry deposits, while the
figures for Ontario were 17 firms and 10.7% of total industry
deposits. 26 Ignoring Quebec, there were only 10 institutions
chartered in the remaining provinces (3 in Alberta, 1 in British
Columbia, 2 in Manitoba, 1 in Nova Scotia and 2 in Saskatchewan)
and the total insured assets of these institutions was 3.4% of the
industry's.
These data reveal in quite arresting terms the fact that the brunt
of the Equals Approach is being primarily borne by federally
chartered institutions and their investors. That is, Ontario, which
enjoys the patronage of firms comprising only 10.7% of the total
industry's assets - a number which has surely declined in the
wake of several recent failures of Ontario-based institutions - is
setting the regulatory agenda for the federal government, which
enjoys almost eight times that amount. Given the almost exclusive
financial responsibility that the federal government bears for the
failure of financial institutions, the necessity, indeed, legitimacy,
of Ontario intervening to protect depositors (meaning the federal
deposit insurance fund) from irresponsible federal legislation is, to
say the least, curious.
Although this discussion suggests that the case for imposition of
the Equals Approach against federally regulated institutions is
weak, it says little about the threat of irresponsible legislation
posed by other provincial jurisdictions. Here, the issue is not so
much the validity of the rationale for the Equals Approach, but
rather the choice of instrument used to vindicate these concerns.
That is, if Ontario is concerned with the opportunistic funnelling
of Ontario depositors' funds to pet industrial policy projects of
other provinces, there are other more appropriate ways to address
26 Because Quebec deposits are insured with another agency, the QDIB, the figures for
Quebec are downward biased. These data were derived from the Canada Deposit
Insurance Corporation.
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these concerns. One possibility is to place greater emphasis on the
disclosure of information which would allow investors to be
apprised of the risks of investing in institutions chartered in lenient
jurisdictions. Alternatively, if regulators are dubious of the
capacity of depositors to respond to, or even understand, such
information, then it may be appropriate for the deposit insurer to
levy special insurance premiums on institutions operating in
notoriously lenient jurisdictions.
Of course, the most obvious mechanism for dealing with the
perverse incentives that encourage institutions and governments
to behave irresponsibly is, as I have argued elsewhere, to reform
the system of regulation so that there are greater incentives for
depositor vigilance over the activities of financial institutions.27
This would require fundamental reform of many of the core
features of the current system of financial regulation. Doing so,
however, would lessen the likelihood that institutions could
escape discipline for irresponsible chartering decisions.
BREAKING THE LOGJAM: MOVING BEYOND THE EQUALS
APPROACH
Assuming that the Equals Approach could be dismantled, what
type of distribution of powers arrangements would take its place?
In considering this issue, I should declare up front my belief that a
properly devised system of decentralized regulation can generate
valuable contributions for the quality of regulatory product
(responsive and innovative legislation) without many ofthe debili-
tating transaction cost, externality, and accountability problems
that plague the current system. The attractiveness of this option is
buttressed further by provinces' intense interest in and
commitment to continued regulation in this area. Quite simply,
wholesale constitutional reordering in favour of the federal
government is unlikely to be achieved without incurring
substantial enmity. As a consequence, I consider the strong form
centralist option no further.
A far more attractive option involves the rationalization of the
current federal scheme along the lines of a European-style mutual
recognition regime. 28 Under such a regime, provinces would agree
Z7 Daniels, supra, footnote 25.
28 A number of commentators have endorsed the value of a mutual recognition model in
this context. See, for instance, Chertkow, supra, footnote 12, and Canada 1992, supra,
footnote 12.
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to allow extra-provincially chartered institutions free rights of
entry to local deposit markets. The chartering (or home) juris-
diction would be vested with primary responsibility for ensuring
the safety and soundness of the institutions it charters, while the
host jurisdiction would be relegated to a secondary monitoring
role. Significantly, however, the secondary monitoring role would
be much more limited than that which Ontario currently exercises
under the Equals Approach, and would perhaps focus on
consumer protection or conduct of business-type regulations. To
ensure confidence in the regulatory approach devised by the
chartering government, and specifically to guard against the possi-
bility of a debilitating "race to the bottom" in regulatory
standards, participating governments would have to agree on a
core set of rules that would serve as a floor below which no
chartering government's regulations could dip. In this way, host
governments would be assured that all institutions would abide by
specified minimum regulatory standards, irrespective of where the
institution was chartered.
The genius of the mutual recognition regime is the balance that
it strikes between the extremes of incoherent decentralization and
stultifying centralization. So long as the irreducible core of
minimum regulation is restricted from overwhelming the scope for
experimentation with distinctive regulatory initiatives, the system
would permit many of the benefits of decentralization (increased
incentives for experimentation, innovation and accountability)
without forgoing the benefits of centralized or co-ordinated distri-
butions of power (reduced externalities and transactions costs).
Supplementing its attractiveness on purely functional grounds is
the greater consonance of this system with the political factors that
make an ongoing role for provincial governments all but certain in
the financial institutions area.
ROADBLOCKS TO REFORM
In view of the strong functional and political case in support of a
European-style mutual recognition regime, what accounts for the
failure of federal and provincial governments to substitute this
more streamlined system for the currently dysfunctional federal
regime? This question is especially salient in light of the relatively
strong endorsement that a mutual recognition regime for loan and
trust regulation has received from both academic and govern-
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mental commentators over the past several years. Even more
perplexing is the fact that a special committee of federal and
provincial financial institution regulators (the Interprovincial
Conference of Financial Institution Ministers) has been meeting
since December 1988 in an effort to define the minimum rules
necessary to operationalize a mutual recognition regime. Despite
good-faith efforts, the performance of the joint committee has
been extremely disappointing. Recently, for instance, provincial
members of the joint committee announced agreement on a core
set of principles for financial institution regulation, but the federal
government refused to endorse the proposed regime for fear of the
damage it would inflict on its newly minted loan and trust statute.29
There has been little, if any, scholarly analysis that focuses on
the transition issues involved in moving from a regime of stable,
cartel-like production to a regime of hurly-burly intergovern-
mental competition. For the most part, scholars have focused their
energies on static analysis, debating the question of whether, and
if so under what conditions, decentralized federalism constitutes a
superior mode of policy delivery to centralized or co-ordinated
federalism. However, this type of analysis begs the central issue of
which institutional arrangements are most conducive to the
creation of competition promoting agreements, and which are
not. In other words, while competition among governments in the
provision of policy may well be desirable, competition alone
cannot create the conditions that facilitate further government
competition - inevitably, some degree of co-ordination is
necessary.
This issue is placed in sharp relief by some of the comparative
work that Roberta Romano has undertaken in the corporate law
area. She analyzes the delivery of corporate law products in the
United States, Canada and the European Community.30 Romano
finds that when, as in the American case, the judiciary created
clear conflict of laws rules that preserved the integrity of each
jurisdiction's corporate law product, a !ively decentralized compe-
29 These include: financial reporting, audit and accounts requirements, liquidity, capital
based and risk weighting of assets, minimum quality asset rules, commercial loan
definition, permissible downstream companies, and quantitative investment rules.
Interprovincial Harmonization of Trust and Loan Company Legislation (March 28,
1991), draft.
30 R. Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (August 10, 1992), draft
manuscript on file with the author.
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tition naturally ensued. However, in stark contrast, when, as in
the process of completing the European market, inter-govern-
mental negotiation was relied on to determine the ground rules
governing recognition of corporations chartered by member
states, clear constraints on competitive interaction emerged.31 The
central teaching of these comparative data is how hard it is for
governments to displace stable, cartel-like systems of legal
production with systems based on intense, inter-governmental
competition in the absence of third party (e.g., judicial) inter-
vention.
What are the factors impeding the creation of competition
promoting regulatory regimes? One possible factor is. the fear of
post-agreement defection. Fear of defection is a common thread
in the literature explaining the failure of negotiating parties to
conclude welfare enhancing agreements. This fear is modelled in
the prisoner's dilemma modeI.32 Although two parties are anxious
to consummate an agreement that will improve their lot relative to
the status quo, they rationally fear defection from the agreement
by the other party because defection will produce gains to the
defector that exceed the gains she will realize from adherence. The
rub is that while the welfare of the defecting party increases, the
welfare of the non-defecting party is actually less than it would
have been had there been no agreement. Thus, unless parties are
able to secure credible assurances of mutual performance, they
will not consummate an agreement in the first place.
In the context of financial institution regulation, the argument
that fear of defection has hobbled the consummation of a welfare-
enhancing agreement rings hollow. It is true that, in the absence of
an ambitious restructuring of the regulatory system, parties will
secretly harbour the desire to defect from an agreement, but the
persistence of those aspirations is of little moment in explaining
the reasons why agreements do not get concluded in the first
place. The key is not whether "bad" incentives exist, but whether
these incentives can be contained by agreement.
31 This point is confirmed by B. Cheffins, "European Community Company and Securities
Law: A Canadian Perspective" (1991),36 McGill LJ. 1282 at pp. 1293-4. Cheffins notes
that European Commission officials were predisposed to centralization ofcompany legis-
lation because they realized that by harmonizing legislation they would remove the
incentive for companies to shift jurisdictions to take advantage of regulatory
divergences.
32 R. Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press for Resources
for the Future, 1982), p. 145; M. Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (New York, John
Wiley & Sons, 1976), chapter 5.
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Thus, an alternative explanation for the failure of the provinces
and the federal government to conclude a mutual recognition
regime lies in the inability of the parties to detect and penalize
defections from the agreement. Superficially, the claim that the
federal and provincial governments are unable to detect and
penalize deviations from formal agreements seems strained.
Extra-constitutional agreement has been one of the chief ways in
which formal distribution of power arrangements have kept up to
date with the evolving nature of the Canadian economy and
society. And, given the pervasiveness of these agreements, a host
of institutions and mechanisms have been devised to monitor
performance and, if necessary, discipline breach.
Perhaps concern over the enforceability of the core rules
necessary to support a mutual recognition regime in the financial
institutions area reflects problems that are distinct to that policy
area, namely the difficulties in relying on formal legal rules to
constrain institutional risk-taking.33 Even cursory review of the
string of failures in Canada over the last decade shows how
imperfect formal rules and restrictions are as instruments for
preventing insolvency. Many of these institutions, through
inadvertence or otherwise, created quite risky portfolios within
the four corners of regulation. While many institutions made sure
they had a mix of different assets in their portfolio, they failed to
diversify these assets geographically, which made them vulnerable
to regional economic downturns.
The implication of this observation is that the competence and
dedication of regulatory personnel constitute an important, if not
central, component of an effective regulatory regime. Ifprovincial
bureaucrats are not truly committed to the spirit of the restrictions
that undergird a mutual recognition regime, then it may be
possible for them to sidestep the rules through discretionary
enforcement activities. However, these problems are not insur-
mountable. By agreeing to rationalize the supervisory activities of
chartering governments by, perhaps, delegating supervision to
one centralized monitoring agency, the scope for government
defection would be confined.
33 A Conference Board of Canada survey of regulatory authorities cited mistrust among
regulators as one of the reasons why agreement in this area has proven elusive. See: B.
Sutton (with G. Glorieux), "The Changing Structure of the Canadian Financial Services
Industry: Volume II, The Perspectives of Regulatory Authorities", The Financial
Services Research Program of the Conference Board of Canada, April 1992 Draft, at p.
55.
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So far, the impediments to agreement have been pitched at a
fairly high level of principle. I do not question in any way the
sincerity of the commitment of negotiating governments and their
representatives to the enterprise of securing a durable and
functional agreement that would support effective intergovern-
mental competition. But just as firms in the private sector are
plagued by endemic accountability or agency problems, so too are
institutions in the public sector. In the public case, agency
problems emanate from the grant of authority going from citizen-
voters to their agents (politicians and bureaucrats). In financial
institution regulation, agency problems are related to the fact that
it is difficult, if not impossible, for interested citizen-voters (and
sometimes even their political representatives) to discern and
understand the positions taken by bureaucratic elites in inter-gov-
ernmental negotiations. This is particularly so given the relatively
complex (hence low saliency) nature offinancial regulation issues.
Once scope is conceded for agency problems, then it is possible
to understand why politicians and agents may not want to adopt an
agreement that would be welfare-enhancing from the perspective
of citizen-voters. As Alan Cairns has observed:34
The growth of one federal and ten provincial governments has produced
large and powerful complexes of institutions and personnel with their own
professional and personal interests and their own official purposes for the
provincial and federal populations they govern.... It makes little sense to
think of these impressive concentrations of power and personnel as super-
structures whose existence and purposes are largely derivative of the
electorate....
In these terms, the failure of governments to put in place a mutual
recognition regime for financial institutions is related to diver-
gences in the welfare functions of citizens and bureaucrats. Like
producers in stable, co-ordinated markets, bureaucrats charged
with regulation of financial institutions may prefer the present
situation of dysfunctional federalism to a superior world of intense
intergovernmental competition.
This propensity is exacerbated by bureaucratic loss aversion. As
a large body of experimental literature has shown, individuals
charged with making important decisions will often "weight losses
substantially more than objectively commensurate gains in the
evaluation of prospects and trades" .35 In the case of financial insti-
34 Alain Cairns, "The Government and Societies of Canadian Federalism" (1977), 10
CanadianJ. Pol. Sci. 695 at p. 702-03.
35 D. Kahneman, J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler, "Experimental Tests of the Endowment
HeinOnline -- 22 Can. Bus. L.J. 151 1993
1993] Breaking the Logjam 151
tution regulation, bureaucrats fear the gale force of competition
because it increases the prospect that other jurisdictions will be
able to lure footloose institutions to their jurisdiction by offering a
superior product.36 Such outward migration impacts directly on
bureaucratic welfare functions by reducing the size of regulatory
fiefdoms.
A RECIPE FOR REFORM
The foregoing analysis revealed in quite stark terms the rather
dismal prospects for concluding intergovernmental agreements
that increase regulatory competition. Quite simply, bureaucrats
(and politicians) have only muted enthusiasm for abandoning the
quiet life of co-ordination and cartelization in favour of the hurly
burly world of competition - an inclination that is buttressed by
loss aversion. And although these problems are common to
virtually all inter-governmental negotiations aimed at creating
conditions for increased governmental competition, negotiations
in the financial institution area are complicated by the difficulties
in specifying clear performance obligations, as well as the condi-
tions for breach.
Against these constraints, how can the logjam in negotiations
for a mutual recognition regime for loan and trusts be remedied?
There is little doubt that the dynamic supporting the existing
impasse is slowly, but assuredly, being whittled away by the
decline of an independent (i.e., non-bank affiliated) trust
industry. Arguably, the more dramatic the industry's decline, the
less leverage the provinces will have in the mutual recognition
bargaining process. But despite steady industry contraction, it is
unlikely that provinces will unilaterally surrender authority over
loan and trust regulation to the federal government. The
perception that an indigenous industry is an important tool in the
capital allocation process dies hard - particulary in Quebec. In
Effect and the Coase Theorem" (1990),98 J. Pol. Econ. 1325 at p. 1327. This effect
derives from the observation that individual utility functions are based not on absolute
but on comparative welfare levels.
36 K. Scott argues that loss aversion is a prime motivating force in the behaviour of
regulators charged with administering the dual banking system in the United States:
"[blanking agencies apparently respond more vigorously to the loss of existing members
than to the prospects of obtaining new members; behavior is more defensive than
aggressive". See K. Scott: "The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in
Regulation" (1977), 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1 at p. 33.
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these terms, the decline of the industry may push in the direction
of an agreement, but is unlikely to secure it. Something more is
needed.
In thinking about improvements to the current system, the most
obvious set of proposals relates to the salutary effect that strong,
dynamic federal leadership could have on the negotiating process.
As my colleague Robert Howse has argued, the federal
government could, as in the case of international negotiations,
assume the role of hegemon.37 Hegemonic leadership involves a
situation in which "one state is powerful enough to maintain the
essential rules governing inter-state relations, and [is] willing to do
so" .38 However, power alone is not sufficient to create a stable
regime; the hegemon must be willing to project that power
towards the end of producing a collective good.39
How does this imperative to act as a hegemon translate into a
concrete course of action in the regulation of financial institu-
tions? First and foremost, effective federal leadership in this area
requires a disciplined commitment to the creation of a regime in
which all governments are able to compete with one another in an
effort to secure citizen patronage, not a regime in which the
federal government is able to exploit bargaining infirmities among
the provinces in an effort to create or shore up what could become
a sclerotic federal monopoly over the provision of policy. In some
cases, the imperative of leadership will require the federal
government to use its superior bargaining position to discipline
opportunistic provincial hold-outs. In other cases, the federal
government should direct its efforts to creating institutions that
will enforce agreements for competition.
What carrots and sticks are available to the federal government
in effecting improvements to the bargaining climate for a mutual
recognition regime? At the outset of negotiations, the federal
government should seize the initiative by framing the goals of the
negotiating process and by identifying the range of issues
necessary to be resolved in order to secure agreement. Most
37 R. Howse, "Comment on Patrick Monahan 'Political and Economic Integration: The
European Experience and Lessons for Canada' ", unpublished comment presented at
the Annual Workshop on Commercial and Consumer Law, 1991, Faculty of Law,
University ofToronto.
38 R. Keohane and J. Nye, "Transgovernmental Negotiations and International Organiza-
tions" (1977), 27 World Politics 39 at p. 44.
39 R. Keohane, After Hegemony, (Princeton, N.J., Princeton Univ. Press, 1984), p. 39.
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importantly, the federal government should prepare principled
position papers on contentious issues in advance of the process,
which would then be circulated to the participating governments
once the negotiations begin in earnest. With a dearth of support
services available to intergovernmental negotiating committees,
federal leadership in the preparation of these materials would
greatly enhance the quality and structure of deliberations. It
would also provide the federal government with an important
tactical advantage in the negotiations.
In a similar vein, if (or more likely, when) negotiations break
down, the federal government should show no hesitation about
using its substantial powers to break whatever impasse has
emerged. At the simplest (and least confrontational) level, the
federal government should be prepared to undertake or
commission research that would evaluate the merits of competing
positions advanced by different parties in a principled and
rigorous way. Too often in the commercial and corporate realm,
divergence over policy issues is a byproduct not of irreconcilable
normative beliefs, but rather of how widely shared goals (like the
promotion of wealth creation) are actually achieved. These sorts
of problems can be resolved (or, at least, substantially illumi-
nated) by rigorous empirical analysis.
For instance, if certain governments disputed either the ambit
of the subjects to be remitted to the minimum core of regulations
or the impact of different regulatory rules on industry behaviour in
the course of negotiating a mutual recognition regime, then
background research could be undertaken on these subjects. In
this respect, like the effect of a mediator's report in labour
relations, federal analysis could expose positions that are bereft of
any normative or empirical support through the sunlight of
rigorous, objective study.
Another key component of an effective negotiating process
would be the creation of formal mechanisms for securing the
inclusion of informed citizen and industry voice. As stated earlier,
among the most disturbing features of intergovernmental negoti-
ation is its lack of public transparency. By formalizing citizen
opportunities for input, further discipline would be brought to
bear on the negotiating process. Hold-out governments would be
forced to justify their positions against clearly articulated expres-
sions of the public interest. Sadly, in the case of negotiations for a
mutual recognition regime there has been little real urgency on the
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part of many of the participating governments to conclude an
agreement. This is not at all surprising when one considers the
stark asymmetries in the views of industry and government
officials regarding the adequacy of the current regime. One
suspects that clearer opportunities for public consultation and
debate would rectify this complacency.
In the end, however, no matter how cogent and principled,
independent analysis, even when buttressed by public pressure,
may only be able to push the parties so far, and resort to more
assertive action will be required to break deadlock. The most
extreme option available to the federal government is to step
outside intergovernmental negotiations and simply impose a
mutual recognition scheme of its own creation on the provinces.
Federal jurisdiction to act in this way draws support from the
steady expansion of the scope of the trade and commerce power
by the Supreme Court.40 Under recent jurisprudence, it is likely
that the court will be willing to condone federal unilateralism
(having some incidental aspect or effect on intraprovincial juris-
diction) where it can be shown that the provinces are incapable of
40 Originally, the trade and commerce power was given narrow scope by the Privy Council
in a series of cases commencing with The Citizens Insurance Co. of Canada v. Parsons
(1881),7 App. Cas. 96. Essentially, federal power was restricted to those matte';"S having
an international or interprovincial nature or trade affecting the whole Dominion. The
court was concerned with the capacity of an expansive reading of the trade and commerce
power to include every regulation of trade, thereby overwhelming provincial jurisdiction
(at p. 110). Slowly and sporadically, since being freed from the shackles of the Privy
Council, the Supreme Court has abandoned the restrictive view enunciated by the Privy
Council. For instance, in Can. (Attorney General) v. Canadian National Transportation,
Ltd. (1983),3 D.L.R. (4th) 16, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 206, Dickson J., concurring found that
the federal government was competent to promulgate combines legislation under the
general limb of the trade and commerce power.
Although the federal government was precluded from regulating specific trades or
business in the provinces, Justice Dickson held, at p. 62, that the situation was different
where "what is at issue is general legislation aimed at the economy as a single integrated
national unit rather than as a collection of separate local enterprises. Such legislation is
qualitatively different from anything that could practically or constitutionally be enacted
by the individual provinces either separately or in combination." Dickson J. then
proceeded to enumerate five indicia that could evaluate the purported validity of an
exercise of power under the general limb: (i) presence of a national regulatory scheme;
(ii) oversight by a national regulatory agency; (iii) concern with trade in general, not with
an aspect of a particular business; (iv) the provinces are constitutionally incapable, either
jointly or severally, of passing such an enactment; and (v) the failure to include one or
more provinces would jeopardize the successful operation of the scheme.
These criteria were subsequently relied upon by the Supreme Court in General Motors
of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 255, [1989]1 S.C.R.
641.
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creating a co-ordinated arrangement by themselves and where the
failure to act is impairing interprovincial capital movements -
conditions which are both demonstrably present in this case.
A more moderate variant on this proposal would involve a
federal constitutional reference to the Supreme Court respecting
the provinces' authority to regulate extra-provincial incorpora-
tions under Equals Approach-like schemes. Even in the absence
of a concrete proposal for a mutual recognition scheme, there is
considerable force to the claim that because the Equals Approach
impairs the core status and governance structure of extra-
provincially incorporated companies, it is ultra vires the provincial
government. 41
In addition to these measures, there are several other less
drastic steps that, akin to "tit for tat" negotiating strategies, could
be used to discipline provincial hold-outs. For one thing, the
federal government could move to establish a Schedule III-type
bank that would allow institutions having concentrated share-
holdings to conduct fiduciary activities in-house. Once reincorpo-
rated as banks, these institutions would enjoy wide protection by
virtue of the expansive interpretation the Supreme Court has
given the federal banking power.42
Alternatively (or perhaps concurrently), the federal
government could restructure the scheme by which deposit
insurance and bail-out assistance is provided for provincial loan
and trusts. If provinces want to regulate, either directly (by
chartering) or indirectly (by licensing agreements), the activities
of loan and trusts, then they would be required to assume the
political and financial responsibility for failure. One way of
achieving this goal would be to exclude provincial institutions
from coverage by the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Another and less drastic solution would involve the creation of
risk-rated deposit insurance pools in a scheme administered by the
CDIC. Under this arrangement, institutions would be segregated
by jurisdiction of incorporation, with the chartering government
41 This claim is strongest vis-a-vis federally incorporated trust companies.
42 See, for instance, Canadian Pioneer Management Ltd. v. Labour Relations Board of
Saskatchewan (1980), 107 D.L.R. (3d) 1 at p. 24, [1980]1 S.c.R. 433, per Beetz J.,
concurring, quoting from the factum of the Attorney General of New Brunswick:
Banking defined as " 'a set of interrelated financial activities carried out by an institution
that operates under the nomenclature and terms of incorporation which clearly identify it
as having the distinctive institutional character of a bank' ".
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responsible for shortfalls in funding. This solution would ensure
that out-of-province depositors would not be made to suffer discri-
minatory treatment at the hands of the chartering jurisdiction, as
the deposit insurance corporation would have day-to-day respon-
sibility over the administration of the fund. 43
CONCLUSION
As in other work I have done, one of the central themes of this
article is the value of decentralized systems of regulation in gener-
ating a regulatory product that is more attentive to consumer
preferences. Such sensitivity is of particular value in the
corporate-commercial area given the relatively low saliency of
these issues compared to others on the broader legislative agenda.
Absent pressure from footloose industry or consumer groups,
legislators are unlikely to take seriously the need for legislative
reform in the corporate-commercial area. One need only take
note of the dismal pace of reform leading up to the federal
bankruptcy amendments to see the substantial difficulties that
even the most committed regulators face in getting corporate-
commercial issues on the legislative agenda.
However, as examination of the current regime of loan and trust
regulation shows, decentralization by itself does not always assure
the creation of sound policy. Indeed, in the absence of workable
framework rules, decentralization can be just as - if not more so
- dysfunctional as centralized arrangements. The challenge for
enthusiasts of decentralized governmental arrangements is to
demonstrate how these decentralized arrangements can be
created through multilateral assent. This is familiar to students of
international political science, who have long wrestled with the
vexing issue of how sovereign, self-regarding states can be induced
to adopt welfare enhancing agreements. And, it is here that
scholars have fastened on the catalytic role that hegemonic
leadership can play in negotiating, securing and enforcing
agreement.
43 The potential for discriminatory treatment of non-resident investors by a chartering
province is more than academic. Following the collapse of the Principal Group of
Companies, the Alberta government (which had granted the companies a charter under
provincial investment contracts legislation) offered compensation that was proportionate
only to the amount of money lost by Alberta residents. Selective treatment of investors
was designed to place pressure on other provinces to make their own Principal investors
whole. See "Playing Regulatory Catch-Up in the Wake of the Code Report", Financial
Times, July 24, 1989.
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The lessons of hegemonic leadership in the international realm
have direct bearing on the prospects of improving the current
malaise in loan and trust regulation: the federal government
should project its power into the regulation of financial institu-
tions with a view to securing co-operative agreement for healthy
competition. The only factor that seriously impedes federal
hegemonic leadership (as in other areas) is the will to power.
Instead of vigorously asserting its very considerable jurisdiction,
the federal government seems more inclined to opt for co-oper-
ative or co-ordinated solutions to federal-provincial problems.
But as Breton has argued in his thoughtful dissent to the
Macdonald Commission Report, one of the inextricable bypro-
ducts of a commitment to co-operative federalism has been an
impairment of the federal government's core responsibility to
create a more competitive and vigorous union: 44
Co-operative federalism, because it proscribes unilateral action, is therefore
a disguised ploy to shackle the federal government, to prevent it from
addressing the problems that it alone can resolve and is constitutionally
responsible for resolving.
One can only hope that in a post-Charlottown world, the federal
government will be more willing in this, as in other areas, to
assume its historic responsibility to create the conditions that
conduce to governmental competition, hence to nation-building.
44 Albert Breton, Supplementary Statement, Report of the Royal Commission on the
Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Vol. 3 (Ottawa, Ministry of
Supply and Services Canada, 1985), at p. 493.
